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HIPAA-Phobia Hampers Efforts To Track And Contain COVID-19
Lee Hiromoto, M.D., J.D.*
Introduction
Passed in 1996, the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
(HIPAA)1 sets privacy standards for healthcare providers, hospitals, and
their business associates. No doubt well-intentioned, HIPAA has come to
embody a force beyond its original purpose. It has become a boogeyman
for those entrusted with health information, even when HIPAA does not
actually apply to them. Doctors, information technology specialists, and
schools officials walk on eggshells to avoid violating federal privacy law.
In the current pandemic, this fear of violating HIPAA has created
inefficiencies in addressing COVID-19. This essay looks at a few ways that
HIPAA-phobia is hampering the flow of information that could help public
health teams combat this illness. Finally, the essay explores regulatory and
legislative ways to address HIPAA anxiety and its negative consequences.
I. Fear Of HIPAA Can Muzzle Doctors’ Ability To Warn The Public Early
On
Medical training ingrains in healthcare providers that patient privacy is
sacrosanct. So much so, that medical providers will err on the side of the
caution when faced with a grey decision to disclose—even if it may benefit
public health. During the early days of the pandemic, in March 2020, the
following exchange between a doctor and a reporter exemplifies what could
have been opportunity spread awareness of where and when the virus may
have been transmitted:
Reporter Ike Bendavid: Can we learn more about this patient? I mean, were
they active in the community? Where did they travel? There are a lot of
people concerned that they are frequenting public spaces in Chittenden
County.

* Resident Physician, Department of Psychiatry, Oregon Health & Science University
1 Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, Pub. L. No. 104–191, 110 Stat. 1936
(1996).
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Dr. Steve Leffler: I want to remind people we are bound by federal law and
what we can tell you.2
This exchange highlights the instinctive fear that healthcare workers have
when revealing information about patients.
At that early stage (this was the second patient in the state), members of the
public could have used the information to self-quarantine and pursue
testing. But Dr. Leffler was reluctant to share information about who might
have been exposed, citing “federal law” (implicitly HIPAA). Contact
tracing is labor intensive, imperfect, and relies on government efficiency.
Publicly notifying potential contacts where and when they may have been
exposed would add another layer of notice to those efforts.
Of note, there are exceptions already built into HIPAA that could justify
release of a COVID-19 patient’s recent whereabouts and activities. One
such exception involves public health and the need to identify those who
were exposed.3 Another exception allows disclosure of information when
“necessary to prevent or lessen a serious and imminent threat to the health
or safety of a person or the public”4 In this scenario, the doctor could have
justified saying more about the patient—one of the first in the state—based
on either of these exceptions. But with the specter of HIPAA lurking, he
chose not to.
The American approach contrasts with that in Israel, where the government
made public where coronavirus cases had been. In one instance in late
February 2020, the Israeli government made public the flight he had taken,
the toy store he had visited, and even the approximate times he was at the
store.5 This stands in contrast to Dr. Leffler’s inability to provide this basic
information to the public due to “federal law.”

Ike Bendavid, Vt. patient with 2nd COVID-19 case in critical condition, WCAX.COM (Mar.
12, 2020), https://www.wcax.com/content/news/UVM-to-provide-details-on-2nd-COVID19-case-NH-reports-6th-case-568739241.html.
3 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(b)(1)(iv) (2016).
4 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(j)(1)(i)(A) (2016).
5 Health Ministry: Israeli with coronavirus visited toy store before diagnosis, TIMES OF ISRAEL
(Feb. 27, 2020). https://www.timesofisrael.com/health-ministry-israeli-with-coronavirusvisited-toy-store-before-diagnosis/.
2
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II. HIPAA-Encouraged Reliance On The Fax Machine Slows Down
Contact-Tracing
HIPAA has rigorous information security requirements (and
correspondingly rigorous penalties) for “electronic” data, which
disincentivize the use of electronic communications. However, these rules
(Subchapter C of Title 45 of the Code of Federal Regulations) specifically
carve out an exception for “transmissions, including of paper, via facsimile,
and of voice, via telephone.”6 This is one of the reasons fax machines were
estimated to account for 75% of medical communications.7
Reliance on the fax machine as a HIPAA compliant mode of communication
can hamper efforts to trace COVID-19 contacts. In Hawaii, local media
reported that “the state’s contact tracing program has relied on two fax
machines to receive the thousands of new positive and suspected case
reports pouring into its offices.”8 The same article noted that after faxes
received, they were then being scanned for a period of time because staff
were not aware that digital copies were automatically made.
Similarly, the fax machine has hindered efforts in Texas, where using “faxes
to report coronavirus cases in the state is a way to ensure a person's privacy is
protected.” Austin’s director of public health is quoted “we have a whole
team of people who have to sort through more than a thousand faxes a
day,” which he described as a “very manual and archaic process.”9 One
could imagine a better system—computerized—where the team sorting
through stacks of faxes could instead be focused on substantive work like
contact tracing.

45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2014).
Brad Spannbauer, Does the Fax Machine Still Have A Place in Modern Healthcare?, HIT
CONSULTANT (Aug. 27, 2018), https://hitconsultant.net/2018/08/27/fax-machines-modernhealthcare/.
8 Marcel Honore, How Hawaii’s Reliance On ‘Labor Intensive’ Fax Machines Hampers Contact
Tracing, HONOLULU CIVIL BEAT (Sept. 4, 2020), https://www.civilbeat.org/2020/09/howlabor-intensive-fax-machines-hamper-hawaiis-contact-tracing/.
9 Erik Ortiz, Amid coronavirus surge, Texas has a contact tracing problem: reporting cases by
fax, NBC NEWS (June 26, 2020) (emphasis added), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/usnews/amid-coronavirus-surge-texas-has-contact-tracing-problem-reporting-casesn1232212.
6
7
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To be fair, HIPAA is not the only reason healthcare depends on the
venerable fax. Much has been said about the role of economic incentives
for healthcare networks and hospitals to create barriers to leaving a given
network.10 But HIPAA’s rigorous information security requirements and
potential penalties only reinforce the economic incentive to use the fax. For
example, the University of Rochester settled a HIPAA violation stemming
from loss of an unencrypted flash drive and theft of a laptop for USD
$3,000,000.11
American dependence on the fax machine contrasts with the high-tech
approaches seen in East Asian countries during the start of the pandemic.
There, digital contact tracing met with early success. 12 But American
healthcare IT, held back in part by HIPAA and its fines, is not there.
III. HIPAA-Phobia Limits Current Efforts To Monitor COVID-19 Spread
In addition to limiting healthcare providers’ ability to share data—a context
in which HIPAA actually applies—the reputational penumbra of that law
has become so large that it has chilled data sharing outside healthcare. Even
those not covered by HIPAA, like schools, worry about violating it. The text
of the HIPAA rules make clear that it only applies to healthcare providers,
organizations, and their business associates.13 Nonetheless, an everyday
appreciation for HIPAA’s (justifiable) privacy protections has snowballed
into a McCarthy-esque situation where officials hold onto information with
white knuckles, lest they be accused of violating HIPAA.

Alyssa Rege, Why the US health system still prioritizes fax machines: 7 things to know,
BECKER’S HEALTH IT (Oct. 30, 2017), https://www.beckershospitalreview.com/healthcareinformation-technology/why-the-us-health-system-still-prioritizes-fax-machines-7things-to-know.html.
11 Press Release, Dep’t of Health & Human Serv., Failure to Encrypt Mobile Devices
Leads to $3 Million HIPAA Settlement (Nov. 5, 2019), available at
https://www.hhs.gov/about/news/2019/11/05/failure-to-encrypt-mobile-devices-leads-to3-million-dollar-hipaa-settlement.html.
12 Yasheng Huang et al., How Digital Contact Tracing Slowed Covid-19 in East Asia, HARV.
BUS. REV. (Apr. 15, 2020), https://hbr.org/2020/04/how-digital-contact-tracing-slowedcovid-19-in-east-asia.
13 45 C.F.R. § 164.500 (2013).
10
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Some school administrators have been unwilling to discuss COVID-19
cases due to fear of even potentially violating HIPAA. When a staff
member tested positive at one elementary school, the superintendent
invoked HIPAA to avoid releasing details: “[d]ue to HIPAA privacy laws,
the identity of the . . . staff member was not disclosed. The staff member’s
position in the school was also not disclosed in connection with HIPAA
privacy laws.”14
In the case of the University of Alabama, which had over 1,000 cases during
one week across three campuses, guidance was issued to faculty in the
English Department that the pandemic makes “ANY reference to student
health a potential HIPAA violation.”15 Someone who was exposed in a
classroom might want to know about an infected colleague, but the
misunderstanding of HIPAA would limit that.
Perhaps more egregiously, lawyers and government officials are not
immune from misunderstanding that HIPAA does not reach beyond
healthcare. The Attorney General of Louisiana—that state’s top legal
official—recently cited HIPAA when declaring his opposition to the state
health department’s release of school-specific coronavirus data. In response
to this release, which was ordered by Louisiana’s Governor, John Bel
Edwards, Attorney General Landry wrote on Twitter: “[S]chools report
specific healthcare information on your child without your consent! I
believe that this order may be in violation of HIPAA.”16
And during the recent White House coronavirus outbreak, former press
secretary Sean Spicer accused a news agency (via Twitter) of violating
HIPAA by reporting about a current staffer’s positive test result. Though
Linda Murphy, Fall River schools report first COVID-19 case, HERALD NEWS (Sept. 21,
2020), https://www.heraldnews.com/news/20200921/fall-river-schools-report-first-covid19-case.
15 Meryl Kornfield, Universities can’t use privacy laws to withhold data on coronavirus
outbreaks, experts say, WASH. POST (Sept. 2, 2020),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/education/2020/09/02/college-coronavirus-privacylaws/.
16 JC Canicosa, Attorney General Jeff Landry is challenging Louisiana public schools and health
department, LA. ILLUMINATOR (Sept. 26, 2020),
https://lailluminator.com/2020/09/26/attorney-general-jeff-landry-is-challenginglouisiana-public-schools-and-health-department/.
14
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the claim is baseless (as noted by one of the law’s authors), 17 a public
accusation of violating federal law is enough to create a deterrent to
information sharing, especially given the power of social media to
disseminate incorrect information.
Less data and less transparency make it more difficult for both
policymakers and members of the public to make decisions that affect
community spread of the pandemic. Should kids (generally or specifically)
go to in-person classes at school? Should I go to work if there is a known
cluster nearby? Knowing how the virus has spread locally would be helpful
to make that call at both the collective and individual levels. But fear of
HIPAA makes those with key data unwilling to share.
IV. Short And Long Term Solutions To HIPAA’s Chilling Effect On The
Coronavirus Fight
Addressing HIPAA-phobia can be done in the short term with executive
action, and longer term with statutory reforms by Congress.
Discretionary Enforcement To Promote Data Sharing
Short-term, the executive branch can calm fears over information sharing
and technology use by announcing discretionary non-enforcement during
the emergency period. One success story comes from the Department of
Health and Human Services (HHS), which announced discretionary nonenforcement of HIPAA’s data safeguard standards to promote telehealth.
Specifically, HHS announced that it would not seek penalties under HIPAA
if providers used an application whose information security may not meet
HIPAA standards.18

Zack Budryk, Shalala corrects Spicer on HIPAA: 'I should know, I wrote it', MSN.COM (Oct.
5, 2020), https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/politics/shalala-corrects-spicer-on-hipaa-ishould-know-i-wrote-it/ar-BB19JmkT.
18 OCR Issues Guidance on Telehealth Remote Communications Following Its Notification of
Enforcement Discretion, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERV. (Mar. 20, 2020),
https://www.hhs.gov/about/news/2020/03/20/ocr-issues-guidance-on-telehealth-remotecommunications-following-its-notification-of-enforcement-discretion.html.
17
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Per HHS’s loosening of rules, “covered health care providers may use
popular applications that allow for video chats, including Apple FaceTime,
Facebook Messenger video chat, Google Hangouts video, Zoom, or Skype,
to provide telehealth without risk that OCR [the HHS Office of Civil Rights]
might seek to impose a penalty for noncompliance with the HIPAA
Rules.”19
Stories about so-called “Zoom bombing” point out that these everyday
voice and videoconferencing applications do not boast ironclad
information security,20 which would make them normally unacceptable
under HIPAA. Thanks in part to this change, telehealth went from 0.1% of
Medicare primary care visits in February 2020 to 43.5% by April 2020.21 By
easing fears of HIPAA (and multi-million dollar fines), the federal
government was able to encourage routine healthcare needs to be met
digitally, cutting away some of the bureaucracy that has kept the fax
machine around.
In a similar vein, the Executive Branch could issue a broader notice of
discretionary enforcement as regards COVID-19. Such a policy would
apply the looser technology rules to contact-tracing efforts to replace the
clunky fax. Similarly, it might offer healthcare providers broader leeway to
report public health risks to the public and those in danger, offering that
good faith efforts to prevent localized outbreaks will not be punished.
Although there already are HIPAA exceptions for public health (noted
above), there is little concrete guidance. Faced with a grey choice, providers
will therefore choose to err on the side of caution and follow the letter of

Notification of Enforcement Discretion for Telehealth Remote Communications During the
COVID-19 Nationwide Public Health Emergency, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERV.
https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/special-topics/emergencypreparedness/notification-enforcement-discretion-telehealth/index.html (last updated
Mar. 30, 2020).
20 Eric Hamilton, Zoom Hacking is on the Rise: Here's What You Need To Do To Be Secure,
TECH TIMES (May 12, 2020), https://www.techtimes.com/articles/249572/20200512/zoomhacking-is-on-the-rise-heres-what-you-need-to-do-to-be-secure.htm.
21 HHS Issues New Report Highlighting Dramatic Trends in Medicare Beneficiary
Telehealth Utilization amid COVID-19, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERV (July 28, 2020),
https://www.hhs.gov/about/news/2020/07/28/hhs-issues-new-report-highlightingdramatic-trends-in-medicare-beneficiary-telehealth-utilization-amid-covid-19.html.
19
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HIPAA scrupulously. While lawfulness is noble, this course protects one
person’s information while that information could help others.
Lastly, such executive action would clearly note that HIPAA does not apply
to schools. Ideally, this action would also address that other federal privacy
laws like the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA)22 would
also have enforcement deferred in cases of good faith efforts to contain the
spread of COVID-19. This would address timidity in releasing data from
the virus’s spread to educational settings. An executive order may be the
best vehicle for such a policy, as there is inter-departmental crossover
between HHS and the Department of Education (which handles FERPA
matters) and Justice (responsible for criminal enforcement).
Longer Term Reform
Longer term, policymakers might look at revisiting HIPAA to reflect those
changes in enforcement in statute. Public health emergencies could allow
for more explicit waivers of HIPAA and FERPA to the extent reasonably
aimed at fighting the spread of illness. Digitization would be encouraged,
instead of disincentivized, as current law does (with carve-outs for analog
communication). Such changes would change the current perception and
climate of fear as regards potential HIPAA violations, facilitating the flow
of public health data. Good faith would be the presumed basis of
adjudicating alleged HIPAA violations, with penalties reserved for the
worse offenders.
A statutory solution would differ from discretionary non-enforcement, as
is currently happening with looser HIPAA enforcement as regards
telehealth. Discretionary non-enforcement is transient and could change
through executive action. Statutory change, on the other hand, would be
the default rule and give actors (doctors, school leaders, IT specialists) more
certainty that they will not run afoul of some law, rule, or regulation and
fall victims to America’s politico-legal bureaucracy.

22

20 U.S.C. § 1232g (2018); 34 C.F.R. pt. 99.
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Conclusion
Medical privacy is undoubtedly an important interest. But it does not exist
in a vacuum. The world is currently facing its greatest public health
challenge in over a century. Efforts to contain the coronavirus, pending a
vaccine or cure, can benefit from the free flow of data to policymakers and
the public. Individual citizens can make better decisions with more
information. Public health agencies can do better contact tracing when they
are free to use digital technology. However, some data-holders are
squeamish to release it for fear of violating HIPAA and incurring penalties.
This misunderstanding of HIPAA is compounded when officials invoke the
law to avoid, deter, or criticize disclosures that could help the public make
decisions about school and work. Moreover, this fear of the HIPAA
boogeyman has sustained technological obsolescence, as seen in the
widespread reliance on the fax machine in American healthcare. We have
the data and the technology to face the novel coronavirus head-on. The
President and Congress can and should take action to make sure that
HIPAA-phobia does not hold us back from using them.

Edited by Ben Davisson

